CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 574th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference will continue today the consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the consideration and adoption of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise a matter pertaining to the work of the Conference may do so. As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to submit for decision by the Conference today the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027, and the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1028, in the order in which those reports were introduced by the respective chairmen.

I have on the list of speakers for today the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representatives of Argentina, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pakistan, Mexico and the United States of America.

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Group, which has been circulated as document CD/1032.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report on the Ad hoc Group's recent meeting, held from 30 July to 9 August, and to introduce the progress report which is in front of you in document CD/1032. Experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended the session.

Last week I had the privilege of attending a meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban together with Mr. Frode Ringdahl, Scientific Secretary of the Ad hoc Group, and Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, Co-ordinator of the ongoing large-scale technical test. We greatly appreciated this opportunity to review in some detail our present activities and to have an interesting exchange of views on verification issues and on the work of the GSE. I hope that, in its deliberations on test ban issues, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will benefit from results already presented by the Group and from results which are to be obtained through our ongoing large-scale technical test. I am sure that the Ad hoc Group in turn will benefit from results to be expected from the NTB Committee.

I will be quite brief in my presentation today, one reason being the presentations already made in the NTB Committee. Another reason is that the Group at present is engaged in the technical planning of further stages of the large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The overall results will be of much more interest, I am sure, to members of the Conference than the technical and detailed arrangements that need to be made for such an extensive global exercise.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

In the overall process of carrying out GSETT-2, the sessions of the Ad hoc Group in Geneva are just the tip of the iceberg. The main part of the work is being done at observatories, laboratories and communications facilities around the world, where hundreds of scientists and technicians are working to make the test possible. Their dedicated work and efforts deserve high appreciation. Our high appreciation also goes to the secretariat for its dedicated support of the Group during its session in Geneva. The Group is at present in the middle of GSETT-2. We are proceeding, as planned, with preparatory experiments to prepare all facilities for the full-scale operational test, tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991. We are gradually improving our performance, people are becoming better trained, communication lines are being established and put to work, and errors in the extensive computer programs used at National and International Data Centres are being discovered and corrected.

Since its meeting in March, the Group has in addition to national and bilateral activities conducted one co-ordinated trial test during the period 19-27 June. Twenty-five countries participated in this test, contributing data from, in all, 53 seismological stations. This is an improved participation as compared to a similar test early this year, when 21 countries and 46 stations participated. The Group also noted with satisfaction that a number of additional countries have expressed their intention to join the experiment and are presently making necessary preparations. Although the participation is gradually increasing, I would like to reiterate that an even broader participation is essential for meeting the overall objective of GSETT-2.

To facilitate such broader participation in the test, the Group decided, at its March meeting, to reduce the technical requirements for participation. While maintaining the prime purpose of GSETT-2, that is routinely to exchange and analyse Level II data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital waveform data, or what we call Level II data, may participate by contributing Level I, or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we today have only few participants, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

While it is important that countries contributing to GSETT-2 participate in the GSE sessions in Geneva, there may be States which find it difficult to provide experts to attend those sessions, but which nevertheless wish to participate in the large-scale technical test. The Co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Basham of Canada, and myself are prepared to work closely with any country which might wish to participate in that way.

In early June 1990 an informal meeting was hosted by the United States at which technical experts, primarily from the four Experimental International Data Centres, participated. The results of this meeting provided a valuable basis for discussions on how to further develop the procedures and computer programs to be used at the Experimental International Data Centres. This work

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

is focused on how to utilize efficiently the waveform data that now is routinely available. This issue still presents a number of technical and scientific challenges.

As you may recall, on 12 April (CD/PV.551), the Conference on Disarmament approved a proposal by the Ad hoc Group that Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should represent the Group at a World Meteorological Organization meeting to discuss the use of its Global Telecommunication System, GTS, during GSETT-2. Mr. Basham attended this meeting in late May and provided the appropriate World Meteorological Organization authorities with the Group's requirements for telecommunication circuits to be tested in GSETT-2. Discussions with WMO made it clear that bilateral or multilateral arrangements are needed among the countries concerned to ensure reliable communications.

The overall purpose of GSETT-2 is to obtain practical experience for evaluating the concept of a global seismological verification system described in the Group's fifth report (CD/903). Evaluation and assessment of the results of the tests conducted is thus an essential element of GSETT-2. During its session, the Group discussed evaluation criteria for GSETT-2, based on draft guidelines worked out by a specially appointed study group. A tentative evaluation scheme will be tested during the forthcoming experiment this autumn.

The Group spent considerable time during the session planning the further activities of GSETT-2. Until the Group's next session, GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, preparing ourselves for the full-scale operational test. In addition to preparatory work and testing at National and International Data Centres, a co-ordinated experimental exchange of data will be carried out during the period 15 October-2 November 1990. This test will facilitate the establishment of reliable means of communication, which is a fundamental element of GSETT-2.

The full-scale test of GSETT-2, referred to as Phase 3, will be carried out in two parts. The first part will take place this autumn from 26 November to 2 December. It will involve the exchange of both Level I and Level II data obtained from all participating stations for 7 consecutive "data days" and processing of that data at the four Experimental International Data Centres. To operate the system for 7 consecutive "data days" - which means that, taking into account all the processing at EIDCs, the whole system will operate for 14 days - will be an important test of the ability of the system to cope with large volumes of data for an extended time period. It will thus pave the way for the second and main part of Phase 3 of GSETT-2, full-scale operation of the system for a continuous period of about two months, which is tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be held at Geneva from 11 to 22 February 1991.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, for introducting the Group's report, document CD/1032. I think I am expressing the feeling of the Conference in saying how much we appreciate what has been done by the Ad hoc Group and Dr. Dahlman in that Group. It is my intention to put before the Conference for decision, at its next plenary meeting, the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts (CD/1032) concerning the holding of the Group's next session, namely from 11 to 22 February 1991 at Geneva.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): My statement this morning is rather unusual because I am speaking on behalf of the delegations of both the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil.

Our two countries have greatly appreciated the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with the item which rightly holds first place among those the Conference has to consider with the aim of ensuring international peace and security. The Conference has been able to establish an institutional framework to serve as a setting for an exercise which, under the terms of the mandate we have given the Committee, will be of a practical nature and can be defined as the first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. As countries which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear military option, Brazil and Argentina are ready to play an active and constructive part in this undertaking. In this regard, we feel prompted to offer a few preliminary remarks.

First of all, we believe that there should be no doubt as to the final goal of the exercise. We are here to draw up a comprehensive agreement that will put an end to all test nuclear explosions in all environments by all States for all time. This seemingly simple statement nevertheless requires us to bear in mind that the task before us, no matter how quickly or in what order we set about it, must be guided by the objective of a universal, non-discriminatory agreement. That is not one objective among many, it is the central aim of the process we are about to undertake. Any attempt to belittle it, or to put undue emphasis on lesser topics, would be a sure recipe for failure and deadlock of the kind that has previously frustrated efforts by the Conference to advance towards this elusive goal of the international community.

The Committee's mandate clearly indicates that we have to concentrate our work on four main areas: structure, scope, verification and compliance. It further states that these are interrelated issues. In this specific context, interrelationship acquires a special meaning, since it rules out the repetition of scenarios familiar to this Conference at past sessions, when our delegations met here to address various aspects of the verification arrangements provided for an agreement that paradoxically was not itself subject to direct consideration in this body. So we were confronted with an unquestionably anomalous situation, which has fortunately been corrected.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

In our view, there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to the conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. What is more, in recent years significant progress has been made both technically and conceptually on the issue of verification, rendering a lengthy debate on the subject unnecessary. The general approach will, in our view, have to be open and at the same time have to avoid selective treatment, since each element of the mandate will have to be analysed in the light of the progress made in the consideration of the others.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a logical concomitant of an international situation which is developing positively and, as has recently been acknowledged by one of the existing military alliances, enables us to envisage a world where the role of the nuclear component of existing arsenals will be substantially diminished. As we all know, nuclear weapon tests today have a clear purpose: the updating of existing arsenals and the incorporation into them of new, more accurate and lethal systems. Not only is this modernization process stimulated by the nuclear tests the nuclear Powers conduct; such tests could be said to be an essential prerequisite of it. In brief, nuclear weapon tests are necessary tools for the continuation of the strategic arms race in its highest and most sophisticated form. The rate at which nuclear tests are being carried out confirms that their essential purpose is the development of new generations of these weapons. It would certainly be most difficult to design new weapons without the support of test explosions.

The clear conclusion for us onlookers in this costly contest is that if the road to a nuclear test ban is blocked, then this must be construed as a lack of political will to leave the arms race definitively behind. In this context, if the talks between the two major nuclear Powers on their strategic systems become a vehicle for the modernization of their respective arsenals, then it makes perfect sense to refuse to adhere to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests. How can we reconcile the fact that, perhaps very shortly, two military alliances may be signing a solemn declaration that they no longer regard each other as adversaries with the continuation of these test programmes? These activities seem to demonstrate not only that there is a lack of interest in resolving one of the most pressing items on the Conference's agenda, but also that proliferation in all its dimensions continues without respite. Nor should it be forgotten that refusal to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is not consistent with legally binding obligations stemming from a variety of international instruments.

A treaty such as we have in mind must, in order to have at least a modicum of credibility, be drawn up with the active participation of all the Powers at present carrying out nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, it should not become an instrument whereby continued testing is condoned through phased schemes that guarantee and permit it at lower yields.

The foregoing is merely to say that, in order to avoid prompt frustration, our efforts must bear the stamp of credibility and consistency between our presence here and our respective national security policies.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

Our statement thus far has focused on the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States, in other words, States that carry out nuclear test explosions. All of them, without exception, bear a primary responsibility for this process since it is they who will actually have to halt testing. It must be recognized, however, that a multilateral effort of this kind comprises a larger number of participants. That is why, given the interests at stake, the task at hand is essentially multilateral. Its implications and scope will determine relations of complementarity with other existing instruments governing States' nuclear activities: for example, in our own region, with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This example, which can also be applied to other areas such as the South Pacific, will call for a detailed effort of compatibilization between different norms.

It should also be remembered that, as is the case in other fields such as chemical weapons or outer space, any agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests completely will have to include provisions to cover the interests of States in all the peaceful applications of nuclear power. Brazil and Argentina, as everyone is aware, are among those States which for many years have vigorously pursued programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, to the unquestionable priority that both our countries recognize to the security aspects of such an agreement, we add the priorities that derive from our technological development needs.

The peaceful course of our nuclear programmes is and always has been aimed at the attainment of a level of development that will enable us to take autonomous decisions in the energy field. In a highly technological world, with serious supply problems, not having our own scientific and technological base would create a situation of technological dependence that would seriously affect our shared objectives of economic and social development. Therefore we believe that, in elaborating something as special as an international treaty to halt nuclear weapon tests and including mechanisms for ensuring compliance, care must be taken to avoid provisions which might create unnecessary controls or additional constraints on the transfer of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Argentina and Brazil are carrying through a policy based on these principles: co-operation, openness and mutual confidence are its linchpins. This nuclear co-operation, which extends to the private sector in both States, has become closer since the taking of the political decision to promote and expand economic integration. The degree of mutual confidence thus generated between us could hardly be matched, in its practical outcome, by any existing mechanism of international control. Precisely because we do not ignore the importance of the security aspects related to nuclear activities, we have set up unique instruments of co-operation and harmonization for our joint policy on the major international issues in the nuclear sphere. These instruments are well known, and perhaps the experience we have so far gained bilaterally in Latin America could be helpful when it comes to setting up the machinery to link the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty with existing international and other accords. Similarly, we wish to restate our commitment to the development of peaceful nuclear technologies without hindrance and free from measures re-establishing in international relations hierarchical orders which have proved not only inefficient but, even worse, unjust.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

The complete cessation of nuclear weapon testing is a long-standing goal of our countries, along with the vast majority of the international community. We are ready to work actively to bring it about. It will be no easy task but, given the necessary commitment by everyone, the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement to end nuclear testing within a reasonable time should not be an over-idealistic goal. For Brazil and Argentina, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty admits of no further delay. As in other relevant aspects of the disarmament agenda, our countries will strive to see to it that instruments designed to bring about peace and stability do not serve to restrict our economic and social development. The two objectives are perfectly reconcilable, as are the nuclear policies of Argentina and Brazil. Perhaps that is why our Governments have instructed our delegations to speak today with a single voice in this historic council chamber.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán, for the statement he has just made on behalf of his own country and of Brazil. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

M. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to welcome you to your post and to express the deep gratitude of the Soviet delegation for the contribution which you have already made to the work of this Conference. Thanks in large measure to your skilful guidance, the Conference is being quite successful in overcoming all the difficulties connected with preparing its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. We are also pleased to welcome in your person a representative of courageous Romania, a country to which we are bound by long-standing and cordial relations. After the overthrow of the dictatorship and Romania's entry on the road of democratic reforms, these relations have acquired a new, broader dimension. We are also pleased to note how the constructive activity of Romania has increased in international disarmament forums and we should like to wish you every success, Mr. President, in concluding the current session and we are convinced that you will represent our forum with distinction during the inter-sessional period.

Similarly, I should like to express our gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Bogumil Sujka, and Oswaldo de Rivero, for their great contributions to the work of the Conference in June and July respectively. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to wish Ambassador de Rivero every success in his forthcoming important role as Chairman of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT Treaty. His experience and knowledge of multilateral disarmament issues, and his diplomacy augur well for the success of that Conference.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to share its views on the main item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - the question which consumes most of our time and effort and which, at the same time, is the most promising. I am speaking of course about the prohibition of chemical weapons. In addition, I propose, in view of the review conference of the 1972 Convention to be held next year, to touch upon the problem of bacteriological biological weapons.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

But first, the negotiations on chemical weapons. The Ad hoc Committee chaired by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, whose efforts we appreciate so highly, has basically finished its work for this session. We already know what new provisions will be included in its report and what changes will be made in the "rolling text". On comparing this text with the previous one, in document CD/961, one comes involuntarily to the rather unpleasant conclusion that not that much progress has been done this year.

Actually, this fact, of itself, need not be and is not so depressing, since often in negotiations periods of rapid progress are followed by periods of reflection and preparation of new breakthroughs. The main reason for our concern at the present state of affairs is some trends that have emerged in the negotiations this year and manifested themselves throughout the summer.

Above all, we are truly concerned over the lack of progress in resolving key political aspects of the question of banning chemical weapons. After all, not many of those aspects were left. At the beginning of this year the Soviet delegation called for focusing attention precisely on the search for solutions to them. Searching there has indeed been, but we are not much closer to the solutions. All too often forward movement has been bogged down in endless discussions over details which, despite their importance, do not determine the essence of States' rights and obligations under the future convention.

Of course, we still have some leeway for working out technical details, but to my mind it will be extremely small if nothing changes on the main issue, namely the extent of agreement on the key aspects of the future convention. On that, more often than not, we are going round in circles, a fact which does not bring us any closer to final results. Sometimes we even witness backward movement, with the sudden revival during the negotiations of positions already abandoned by their authors and taking no account of the tremendous amount of work done over the past few years. Moreover, sometimes we engage in a kind of diplomatic minuet, with old positions being taken up by people who convincingly criticized them in the past.

In this respect, we cannot but agree with Ambassador von Stülpnagel, who, in his farewell statement at the Conference on 24 April this year, said that belabouring problems is not necessarily the best way to arrive at better solutions and diagnosed us as sometimes simply lacking the will to achieve results. Unfortunately, several months after the departure of Ambassador von Stülpnagel his words still remain valid.

Nevertheless, we do not share the view sometimes heard in the corridors that lately the situation in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons has seriously deteriorated. The difficulties we are faced with today are rather the result of the fact that concerns which until recently remained latent are now starting to surface. We are going through a complex and sometimes painful process of maturing of the major political problems whose resolution should pave the way for a final breakthrough in the negotiations.

I believe that the experience gained at this session gives us grounds for suggesting the preparation of a package solution to these problems. The point of it, in our opinion, would be to undertake a political search for proper

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balances between the interests of the negotiating States over the entire subject-matter of the negotiations. Indeed, today the question of the future convention is increasingly taking on a political dimension. The time is coming for responsible, principled solutions, which probably cannot be arrived at solely through the language of the draft Convention and the annexes.

We therefore support the idea of convening, in the relatively near future, a special meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at the level of Foreign Ministers, about which the Ambassador of France, Mr. Pierre Morel, in particular recently spoke so convincingly. We believe that the purpose of meeting should be to overcome the remaining obstacles in the way of the convention. At such a meeting the ministers could, for example, approve the main provisions of the convention and give delegations instructions to finalize as soon as possible the necessary technical documents and annexes to the convention so that the draft could be opened for signature by Heads of State or Government before the end of 1991.

Sometimes doubts are expressed about whether it is advisable to convene a ministerial meeting if it does not go beyond repeating old positions and making general appeals while the problems would remain unresolved. In our view, a meeting of that kind is, indeed, unnecessary. But what is being talked about is a productive meeting. For that, we feel, there must be agreement in principle as soon as possible on beginning the practical preparations for a meeting having as its focus the development of a package of understandings of principle.

Let us consider the following scenario. Although I am not certain that it is altogether the correct one, perhaps it may be advisable to ask the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, who this year made such a tangible contribution to our negotiations, to initiate as of now consultations on the question of convening a ministerial meeting so that definite decisions could be reached in New York.

Of course, an essential, but by no means the only condition for the success of a ministerial meeting is that we should all understand clearly exactly what we expect from the convention and what problems we want to resolve through it. It goes without saying that for anyone to be without instructions for protracted periods does not facilitate negotiations. There is a Russian proverb: seven persons do not wait for only one. And here we sometimes find ourselves in a situation where seventy parties must wait for one. But this seems to be our fate at multilateral negotiations.

The work carried out by the Ad hoc Committee this year has, in our view, helped to identify clearly enough the set of problems on which political solutions are needed. These include: the verification system and, first of all, challenge and ad hoc inspections, ensuring the universality of the future convention, the question of non-use of chemical weapons, as well as assistance in protection against chemical attacks; co-operation in peaceful chemistry; and sanctions. In addition to these problems, but somewhat separate from them, are the question of the composition of the Executive Council of the international organization and the question of its financing. I should like to dwell on some of these issues.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

As stated by many representatives who took the floor before me, for the future convention to be an effective tool for ensuring security, it must have an effective verification mechanism. Such a mechanism is inconceivable without challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections which, as the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, said, must create confidence that the stocks declared really do constitute all the stocks, and that the facilities declared are indeed all the facilities. If that is so, then the essence of the problem is how to conduct such inspections at facilities not declared by States under the convention.

There is probably no need to recall in detail that the Soviet Union's attitude towards this form of international verification suggested by the United States in 1984 has not always been positive. At first, what prevailed in our approach was apprehension that abuse of such inspections might result in the disclosure of sensitive information not related to the convention. However, in 1987, after assessing the needs of verification from the point of view of the total banning of chemical weapons, from the point of view of the specific tasks our convention must fulfil and in the light of the declared positions of other participants in the negotiations, the Soviet Union made an important political decision to support the inclusion in the convention of provisions on irrefusable challenge inspections with respect to any location or any facility at any time upon the request of any member State and without any exceptions.

As a result of joint efforts by the participants in the negotiations, and of consultations held by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons over several years, we were, I think, able to formulate by the beginning of this a generally acceptable concept of challenge inspections. It combines the possibility of inspecting any location with measures, based on the use of alternative methods of inspection and the concept of managed access, to prevent abuse. What is more, this approach has proved itself in several trial inspections conducted by negotiating parties. The Soviet Union has also conducted its own national challenge inspection, and with the same conclusions, although it must be said that it is the United Kingdom which has the richest and most valuable experience in this field.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the document on challenge inspections prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in April and then improved during the summer consultations is a good basis for agreement. In particular, we consider a good idea the provision in that document to the effect that, where necessary, the decision as to the suitability of alternative measures shall be taken by the Director General of the future organization. The Soviet delegation regrets that this language has not been included in the draft convention, where we would like to see it. We hope that the work on the Chairman's document regarding the text of article IX of the convention will be continued and finalized during the inter-sessional period.

In our view, it is also important to make further efforts to develop the important verification measure of ad hoc inspections. Obviously, the final solution to this question cannot be found outside the context of the verification system as a whole, including both challenge inspections and routine inspections, since each of these measures must play its specific role

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in the mechanism of the future convention, complementing the others. On the other hand, the work already done on ad hoc inspections has revealed a whole range of interesting approaches capable, to our mind, of increasing the objectivity of the verification system and making it more flexible.

As for the Soviet Union, it supports the idea of conducting ad hoc inspections both at the request of States parties and at the initiative of the bodies to be set up pursuant to the convention, on the basis of agreed yearly quotas which would not put any State in a disadvantageous position. From that point of view, we welcome the document on ad hoc inspections introduced by the United States delegation. We believe, however, that the pivot of the proposal on ad hoc inspections - the idea of establishing registers of national chemical industries - is not yet fully developed. Perhaps the difficulties which some delegations are experiencing with respect to the concept of ad hoc inspections stem precisely from lack of clarity as to precisely which facilities would be subject to such inspections and, hence, what in practice these inspections can add to routine inspections and challenge inspections.

The results of the present year have shown that ultimately both the success of our negotiations and that of the convention in general depend on finding a solution to the problem of universality of the future convention. It seems rather difficult to find a single, universal formula for the solution of the universality problem. In this respect, States' declarations of their intention to become original signatories of the convention, regional initiatives, the involvement of parliaments, to bilateral diplomatic contacts, and work within the United Nations framework, including at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, all merit attention and support. It might also be worthwhile considering establishing a system of additional incentives to join the future convention and the possibility of introducing additional restrictions on the export of specific chemical products to countries that refuse to become parties.

Ensuring for the future convention universality guaranteeing the destruction of chemical weapons all over the world is the aim of the proposal by the USSR and the United States which provides for the convening at the end of the eighth year after the convention's entry into force of a special forum to determine whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for proceeding to the complete destruction of the remaining minimal stocks of chemical weapons. This proposal has caused varying responses and at times criticism. With all due respect to the views of those who do not agree with the essence of this proposal, I would like to try to clarify certain misunderstandings, which I believe lie at the basis of this criticism.

First of all, there is and can be no question of changing the future convention into a non-proliferation treaty. The USSR/United States proposal does not repeal to any degree the obligation completely to destroy chemical weapons, not to mention chemical weapons production facilities. On the contrary, the point of it is precisely that all States without exception should be in an equal position as regards chemical weapons. Moreover, this proposal is designed, at least in the view of its authors, to encourage States that today have chemical weapons to join as soon as possible in the process of confidence-building and openness and to be among the first parties to the future convention. Lastly, it should be noted that, unlike the now familiar

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original idea of 2 per cent, the decision to proceed to the final stage of chemical weapons destruction will not be taken individually by the States possessing chemical weapons but will be a matter for consideration at a conference of all the parties to the convention. We are prepared for a substantive discussion of the proposal to hold such a conference in order to study all the problems in detail and to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.

Naturally, the universality of the convention depends in large measure on its content, on how far it meets the future parties' vital security interests. From this point of view, a key issue is how the convention resolves the problem of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. For its part, the Soviet delegation is firmly in favour of including in the convention an obligation for absolute and unconditional prohibition of any use of chemical weapons.

At the same time, we support the proposal to work out collective measures to counteract the use of chemical weapons. To that end, there might be concluded between States parties and the Technical Secretariat special agreements specifying the forms, types and order of assistance to be provided pursuant to decisions of the Executive Council. Such machinery for mutual assistance might include, as an integral component, a voluntary fund to provide assistance to States parties in the event of the use against them of chemical weapons. The fund could be made up of contributions in cash and in kind, including the provision of means of protection against chemical weapons. Moreover, we are prepared to support the proposal that if chemical weapons are used against a State party to the convention, the Director General could take a decision, in consultation with members of the Executive Council, to provide emergency assistance to that State party, primarily assistance of a humanitarian nature.

The road to ensuring the universality of the convention passes as well through practical preparation by States parties to participate in the agreement. Such preparation may take various forms. It may include trial inspections, co-operation in the development of instruments, establishment of national structures to ensure compliance with the convention, and lastly the drafting of required changes in national legislation. In this respect, we welcome the decision by the President of Argentina to establish to study questions pertaining to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons a national commission which, as Ambassador García Moritán stated, is intended as a prototype of a national body for the implementation of the convention.

We also welcome the efforts by Finland to establish a laboratory network for the future convention, and in particular we state that the Soviet Union is ready to participate in the inter-laboratory test scheduled for this autumn. The USSR has designated the laboratory of the Shikhany military facility for this test.

For the Soviet Union, practical preparation for participation in the future convention is basically connected with the implementation of the bilateral USSR-United States Agreement on the non-production and destruction of chemical weapons, and to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding regarding a verification experiment and data exchange.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

A national chemical weapons destruction programme is currently under consideration in the Soviet Union. The draft programme was submitted in April of this year to the Supreme Soviet and is now being examined in the Supreme Soviet's subsidiary bodies. The draft, in the preparation of which 18 ministries and government departments took part, contains several options for the destruction of USSR chemical weapons stocks - options which differ from one another both as to the number of destruction facilities planned and their location, and, of course, as to cost. The extreme options provide either for the setting-up of a single national destruction centre or for the construction of destruction facilities at every chemical weapons storage site. Priority attention is given to the protection of the environment, of facility personnel and of the population in the area of facilities. For our part, we intend to spare no effort to implement the provisions of the bilateral agreement, which provides for destruction to begin no later than 1992, for the annual rate of destruction to attain 1,000 tonnes in 1995, for 50 per cent of stocks to be destroyed no later than 1999, and for reduction to the level of 5,000 tonnes by the year 2002.

On the whole the USSR-United States process of data exchange and visits to the respective military chemical facilities in both countries pursuant to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding is developing successfully. The first exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities took place early in June. The end of August will see the completion of the second round of visits, which are much broader in scope, and during which Soviet and United States experts will visit a number of chemical weapons production and storage facilities as well as civilian chemical plants. The visit of Soviet experts to the United States has already taken place and soon there will be a return visit of United States experts to the USSR. The USSR and the United States plan to complete the programme of visits in the framework of the first stage of the Memorandum early next year.

In conclusion, I would like to share some views concerning the Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in September 1991. I believe that the experience of implementation of this Convention has shown its weak point: the absence of a system of effective verification of compliance and the lack of a well-developed mechanism for the implementation of confidence-building and openness measures. This situation may be explained to a large extent by the period during which the Convention was drawn up and by the approaches of the time to issues of international verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, the Convention is an example of the great responsibility shown at that time by all States, which demonstrated in practice that, when there is political will to conclude a disarmament agreement, even the absence of a solution to the verification problem is not an obstacle.

A great deal has changed since then: verification and openness issues have ceased to be a stumbling-block in negotiations. At any rate, that is our hope. The experience of collective work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons provides an ample picture of what a system of international verification and openness in the framework of a multilateral treaty may look like under the new conditions. We believe that the time has come to reconsider

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

approaches to the Biological Weapons Convention from these positions - bearing in mind, of course, the particularities of the subject-matter of that Convention.

The Soviet delegation believes that verification of compliance with the Convention could include, for example, exchange of agreed data; inspections at declared facilities; and challenge inspections of those sites and facilities with regard to which suspicion of breaches arises. We reaffirm our support for the idea of setting out agreed measures to strengthen the verification system in an additional protocol to the Convention.

Thought might, for example, be given to the following possibility for resolving this problem. States parties to the Convention would compile national biological registers listing all facilities P4 of biological protection, as well as all facilities with a lower level of protection if they carry out work on protection against biological weapons (irrespective of who orders that work) or perform any other activities on instructions from the Ministry of Defence. Facilities included in national biological registers would be subject to a kind of "initial inspection" and thereafter to inspections at any time, without the right of refusal. If necessary, a quota system could be devised for inspections of this kind. In addition, the verification mechanism might include challenge inspections at undeclared facilities. Of course, it would also be necessary to develop and to agree upon inspection procedures that would enable the facts to be established in cases of breach of the Convention but would not lead to the disclosure of confidential information that was not relevant to such cases.

As to confidence-building and openness measures, they might include roughly the following steps: exchanges of visits to facilities that would be declared under the data exchange; encouragement for declassification of activities of relevance to the Convention; exchange (and secondment) of scientists, including scientists working at declared facilities; organization of joint research, primarily research on prevention and treatment of natural disease caused by agents that are potentially dangerous from the point of view of biological and toxin weapons; establishment of an international data bank on activities performed in various countries that are of direct relevance to the Convention. All these measures might be considered at the forthcoming Review Conference of the Convention.

An important direction for efforts to prepare a successful Conference might be expansion of the participation of States parties to the Convention, as well as of other countries, in the exchange of relevant data, as provided for in the recommendations of the previous, 1986 Conference. Without general participation in already agreed confidence-building measures and scrupulous implementation of the initial agreements on that score, it would be difficult to talk about the agreement and execution of new, broader measures in this field.

The ban placed on biological weapons by the Convention must become truly global, and that naturally requires accession to the Convention by all States. We urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the forthcoming 1991 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to be an important event. We believe that forum should assess the results achieved since 1986 in increasing the effectiveness of the Convention and agree upon further measures to strengthen the régime established under the Convention. The Soviet Union intends actively to participate in efforts to ensure the success of the Conference and is ready favourably to consider any constructive ideas and proposals from other countries aimed at strengthening this very important international agreement in the field of actual disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for his kind and cordial words concerning the Chair, my country and Romanian-Soviet relations.

I now call on the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, to introduce his report on the informal open-ended consultations concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been distributed as document CD/WP.395.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I have asked for the floor to present the report on the informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, which I had the honour of chairing. The report is contained in document CD/WP.395 which has been circulated today.

The subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament has been under review for several years already. At the beginning of this year's session, a number of speakers reiterated the view that the Conference needed to constantly adapt itself to unfolding events in the outside world, perhaps now more than ever before. These ideas fell on fertile ground, and informal open-ended consultations were initiated in an effort to address the two central themes of procedural review and substantive adaptation. The consultations which took place subsequently were noticeably open, frank and thorough, and resulted in consensus on a number of issues. The report contained in document CD/WP.395 details the major trends of the discussions and identifies the areas in which consensus was seen to emerge.

Some of these points of consensus - for example, those relating to the change in the schedule of the annual session and its division henceforth into three parts; the reduction in the overall number of plenary meetings; the manner in which subsidiary bodies and their mandates are to be established and the simplification of the programme of work - would require immediate decision and the Conference will hopefully decide about them before the current session ends.

Several other elements of consensus are also important because they represent widely shared hopes and desires. There was hope, for example, that the fundamental rule of consensus which governs the working of the Conference would be implemented with some flexibility, particularly where vital national interests were not involved. There was hope that delegations would make greater efforts to limit their interventions in the plenaries to 15 minutes.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

There was hope that the positive and constructive procedure followed this year to enable the maximum number of non-member States to participate in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies would continue in future years also.

In sum, therefore, this series of consultations has shown above all the willingness of the Conference to move forward in the consideration of its improved and effective functioning and to keep the subject under continuing review, not only in a constant and obvious effort at self-improvement, but also because of the overriding need to adapt itself substantively to a changing world. The consultations are therefore to be seen as the beginning of a process - a happy beginning, which I had the honour to share.

Before concluding, I would like to express my personal thanks to all the member delegations of the Conference for their committed and assiduous participation in the consultations and to the Secretary-General and his staff for the particularly useful inputs and support received from them.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his introduction to the report in document CD/WP.395, which was distributed today in the Conference room. I have asked the secretariat to distribute an informal paper with a draft decision on some of the points of the report just introduced by Ambassador Kamal. It is my intention to invite the Conference next Tuesday, when we have heard the entire list of speakers, to take note with appreciation of that report. Subsequently, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider the draft decision in the informal paper the secretariat distributed today. Immediately thereafter we shall resume the plenary meeting to adopt the draft decision.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marin Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of 21. But, beforehand, I should like to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference for this month and assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation.

(continued in English) The Group of 21 should like to put on record its deep appreciation for the manner in which Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan has been conducting the informal consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. The report on these consultations, contained in document CD/WP.395, has just been introduced and the Conference will have to take a number of decisions regarding several organizational aspects of our work. The Group of 21 expresses the hope that the proposed changes in our annual sessions and in the number of plenary meetings will contribute, however modestly, to our work.

The Group regrets that in 1990 the Conference has again failed to advance substantially in its consideration of its agenda items. On seven of the eight items negotiations have yet to begin and even on the elimination of chemical weapons, the expectations and optimism of February have given way to increasing frustration in August.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The Group therefore wishes to reiterate its position that the best way of enhancing the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament would be to produce tangible results with regard to the items on its agenda. For this to occur, the members of the Conference will have to demonstrate greater political will to move forward on the substantive issues before us as well as on several other questions which were discussed in the informal consultations and which are identified in the report we have received this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me also to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and to pledge to you the full co-operation of the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Conference on Disarmament winds up its 1990 session, I want to take a moment to look at the chemical weapons negotiations and share some observations about where we have been and where we have yet to go. When I first arrived here in Geneva, in January this year, there seemed to me to be great optimism and enthusiasm that a chemical weapons ban was within sight. All of us were transfixed by the political changes sweeping across Europe. Arms control and security negotiations, so long tended, were finally beginning to bear fruit. Conclusion of a strategic arms reduction treaty seemed imminent. Agreement on significant reductions in conventional arms in Europe was within grasp. On chemical weapons, the prospect of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could be seen on the horizon. All these events combined to fuel expectations that 1990 might also be the year we gave real impetus to the multilateral chemical weapons convention.

Progress has, however, not been what we had hoped for this year. For the United States part, our review of chemical weapons issues was only concluded this month. But many others in this room contributed to the delay as well and, as the United States made its conclusions known on several vital questions, a certain atmosphere of recrimination and finger-pointing replaced the dispassionate discussion of national perspectives that should be the medium of serious negotiation. We are likely to conclude this session of our Conference, I regret to say, on a sour note.

Actually, we did get many things done. Much of our progress centred on legal and institutional issues. Development of the two-tiered approach for changing and amending the treaty was significant. To be effective the convention cannot be frozen in time. It needs to be flexible and mutable, adaptable to advances both in science and in verification technology. At the same time, it needs to be able to withstand erosion or elimination of the core of the treaty - those fundamental obligations which will make the convention a truly comprehensive ban. The work we accomplished here this year ensures that the convention will be able to do both.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Some progress was also made in incorporating provisions in the convention on settlement of disputes and sanctions. The United States was initially sceptical. Consultations with delegations here, and review of your arguments in Washington, however, pursuaded us that the chemical weapons convention might usefully include such provisions. Each sovereign party must, of course, make decisions for itself about whether others are complying with their obligations under the convention. The treaty organization might, however, recommend or suggest to States parties measures which could include sanctions in response to violations.

We have pressed further ahead on jurisdiction and control. We will all need to decide the extent to which each of us is able to enforce our laws with respect to activities in the private sector and outside the boundaries of our countries. The United States is confident that we will succeed in narrowing our differences.

The order of destruction for eliminating chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities was worked out and incorporated into the rolling text. This complex, technical section provides the framework for States' preparations and plans, and sets out a practical system which can accommodate the destruction requirements, not only of the two States that have already declared their chemical weapons but also of those that have yet to do so.

We also made important progress on a number of technical issues, including agreement on a common definition of production capacity and thresholds for monitoring the chemical industry, and on provisions for declaration of past transfers of chemical weapons. We also made some progress in the area of schedules and guidelines, where nearly all of us agree on the importance of covering toxins under this convention.

Another issue on which there has been movement is "old chemical weapons". No one disputes that under the convention chemical weapons will not be retained and will be declared and destroyed. All of us seem to accept that the presence of chemical weapons on the territory of a State party will trigger the obligation to declare their existence, regardless of whether they are that State party's or another country's chemical weapons. We all acknowledged this year, however, that the circumstances for chemical weapons being present on a country's territory differ. These differing circumstances give rise to the differences in approaches and attitudes concerning countries' responsibilities for the disposition of old chemical weapon stocks. The United States believes we will ultimately find a solution. We are confident that this can be done without opening up questions of reparation or debates about history.

The United States believes that this body has made remarkable progress toward the conclusion of a comprehensive and global chemical weapons ban since active negotiations got under way six years ago. If the pace has not met everyone's expectations recently, perhaps it is because the problem has changed since we first began. The primary goal then was to bring the United States and the USSR together to eliminate their chemical weapons capabilities. For a sizeable number of delegations around this room, a chemical weapons ban was an East-West, a United States/Soviet problem. CW is no longer primarily a United States/Soviet problem. The United States and the Soviet Union are the

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

only two countries in this room which have publicly declared themselves to be chemical-weapon States and taken active steps to begin eliminating their capabilities. For our part, the United States' new chemical weapons destruction facility at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific began test destruction operations last month with nerve-agent-filled munitions, in preparation for full-scale operations in 1991. This past June we also successfully completed destruction of the entire United States stockpile of the incapacitating agent BZ.

The plain truth is that as I speak the United States is chemically disarming. Not only has the United States ceased its production of chemical weapons, but it has also actually begun the process of dismantling nearly all its deterrent capability.

In June, the Soviet and United States delegations jointly tabled a proposal that our two Presidents thought might help promote universality. In that agreement, our two countries agreed to cease production and begin destroying our stocks before the multilateral treaty is even concluded. We have further agreed that, within eight years of the treaty's entry into force, we will both have destroyed all our chemical weapon stocks except for 500 agent tons - in other words, between 98 and 99 per cent of what we started with. If at that point we have been joined by the countries that have turned what began as a bilateral problem into a global threat, then we will destroy the remaining stocks as well.

The United States and the USSR did not make this proposal to divide these negotiations or, as some claim, to turn the comprehensive convention into a partial ban. The only way it will be a partial ban is if others - many of whom are here today - fail to do their part. We do not want or intend to retain chemical weapons indefinitely. Quite the contrary. The United States wishes to see all chemical weapons - and I emphasize the word "all" - eliminated. But we will not be the only chemical-weapon States to eliminate our stocks, while others who are part of the global CW threat stay out of the convention. This would plainly be discrimination in reverse, something we are astonished to hear advocated by countries traditionally so committed to equality.

No one here today can know with any certainty which States will have adhered and which will have chemical weapons eight years into the treaty régime. The United States believes stablility is best enhanced by assessing the situation together at the eight-year conference. If our critics have constructive ideas for better ways to accomplish this, we will be happy to hear them.

A similar misunderstanding of United States intentions seems to centre on how this convention deals with responses to the use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. On the one hand, some delegations see this issue very narrowly as the types of assistance others would be obligated to give to them. Others see it as a way of pre-establishing procedures and arrangements for facilitating and expediting the provision of assistance in the event they or others are attacked or threatened with chemical weapons. The United States is willing to discuss various approaches to assistance, but we consider assistance to be only one aspect of how to respond to the use of CW. Another

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aspect is deterrence, i.e., the counterthreat of retaliation so long as CW stocks remain. This is the aspect, though, that no one wants to discuss in terms of the real world.

The United States has said simply that, if we are attacked with chemical weapons, we must have a variety of response options, including the option to respond in kind so long as we still have some chemical weapons. We earnestly wish that such precautions were unnecessary. But, as the sad developments of the last two weeks show all too clearly, setting a good example is not enough. The United States must ask why many delegations seem more concerned about the United States than about outlaw States that are all too ready to brandish their well-practised CW capabilities in support of aggressive designs.

The United States delegation would like to think that this summer has been one of the last stages before bringing our negotiations to conclusion. We need to be realistic though. What lies ahead is resolution of issues which have confronted and confounded us since 1984. The polemics and procedural challenges we have all witnessed this summer are indications to me that we have reached the inevitable phase in our work when the tough questions are at last on the table.

When we return to these negotiations later this fall and next year, the United States delegation will be ready to roll up its sleeves and grapple with the remaining issues.

We will want to hear then more from our Chinese colleagues about their new challenge inspection proposals. We would like to hear from our Peruvian colleagues about the ideas they have just proposed for protecting the environment. We want to have a real exchange with non-aligned delegations on the interrelationship of routine, ad hoc, and challenge inspections, and we want to explain why we believe a three-part verification system creates the most effective and least confrontational régime possible for building confidence in compliance.

The United States has no hidden agenda. We continue to be committed to concluding a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons. The agreement the United States adheres to, however, will not be a lowest-common-denominator arrangement set forth in ambiguities that paper over real differences. We understand the reluctance, particularly after weeks of negotiating, to accommodate late-coming positions or controversial views. But none of us will let our vital security interests be overridden.

It says something about the artificial, rarified atmosphere of this Conference that we are concluding our work for the session by concentrating so intensely on footnotes and brackets, while in the real world the aggressive use of chemical weapons is boldly and quite credibly threatened. Let us move our work to conclusion in a spirit of compromise, excluding extraneous goals, so that the force of legal obligation and deterrent power of effective verification prevent this from happening again.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Ledogar, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

(The President)

I have no further speakers on my list. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage of our work? That is not the case.

As I announced earlier today, I shall now submit to the Conference for adoption the reports of the Ad hoc Committees contained in documents CD/1027 and 1028. I propose that we proceed now to the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I propose that we consider now the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1028. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I have just learned that the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Peter Dietze, will be leaving Geneva soon and that he will not be in Geneva next week when we complete our work for this session. This plenary meeting is the last one he will be attending. I should like to emphasize the positive role that Ambassador Dietze has played in the Conference. His professional skill, his diplomacy and his commitment to the Conference, together with his cordial nature, have made a valuable contribution to our work throughout the years he has spent with us. On behalf of the Conference, I extend to him and to his wife our very best wishes.

I give the floor to Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, I would like to thank you very much for the kind words you have addressed to me for the work I accomplished as head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament.

As you said, the Conference on Disarmament terminates its summer session next week and I will not be in Geneva until the end of September. Therefore permit me, following a tradition of this forum, to place on record some personal remarks. In turn, these remarks are not so personal as the conclusion of my work at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is causally related to the sweeping and historic changes which have taken place in my country and all over Eastern Europe in the past months.

Important developments have been unfolding. There is no telling what the impact on international co-operation, including in the field of disarmament, will be. It is, however, quite certain, I think, that these developments will bring us closer to the jointly avowed aim of a world without weapons and wars, and I think this is borne out by the recent steps of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as by the continuation of the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Vienna, to mention only a few examples.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

In a few weeks time, the German Democratic Republic will be incorporated into a united Germany - a Germany, I believe, feeling committed to freedom, human dignity and democracy, a Germany taking part in the construction of a new and unified Europe and in the creation of new forms of good-neighbourly relations, a Germany, I believe, resolutely campaigning for security, disarmament and arms control. Wherever we Germans will be led by history, it is, I am firmly convinced, the will of our people that never again war, but only peace, shall emanate from German soil. We have learned our historical lesson.

I belong to the generation that witnessed the horrors of the Second World War and the time after - a generation that knows what war means. This has probably been my key experience that induced me to do everything to ensure that this will not happen again and that headway be made on the road to disarmament notwithstanding all the obstacles. I was 12 years old when the Federal Republic of Germany was founded. In the following year I experienced the founding of the German Democratic Republic. I have been, in the true sense of the word, a child of this country. I have grown up in this part of Germany, and this is my home. In September 1973 I was present in New York when the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted as equal members of the world community to the United Nations Organization. In all the following years, I believe, I tried to contribute my share to dealing peacefully with one another, developing prosperous international co-operaation and setting the stage for the conditions in Europe to be created as they exist today. With the unification of Germany, for me, the wheel turns full circle. The division of Germany and the division of Europe has now become part of history - and that is good.

The fact that at the next session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament only one Ambassador will represent the united Germany in this room, is a visible expression of the march of events. And I am convinced that a fresh start will be made resulting from the increased responsibility not only for a peaceful and unified Europe but also for this unique multilateral disarmament forum. In the past years I think that the two German States have added essential contributions here in Geneva, if I may be allowed to pronounce judgement on that. A united Germany, I am certain, will also henceforth make vital contributions to arms limitation and disarmament. As far as I am personally concerned, I hope, that it will be only a break in my work in the field of multilateral relations and disarmament.

It is not presumptuous to express here my expectation that the Conference on Disarmament will conclude its most important work in the course of the next year and will agree on the convention on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not only a must, it is also a want on our part. Nobody can relieve us of this task. As has become manifest during this year's disarmament session, this can only be achieved with each other and not without one another, but in no way against each other. Certainly, the prohibition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, the complete destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities is not an easy exercise. However, the time is ripe for it. The idea of convening a Foreign Ministers' meeting on this matter, which is gaining ground, raises well-founded hopes that the last stage of negotiations

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

can be started. In a time of rapid change, in which chances and risks lie closely together, as recent developments show, the speedy conclusion of a CW convention would be a decisive contribution to lasting stability.

Such a Foreign Ministers' meeting - if possible, at the beginning of the 1991 session - could provide the urgently needed political impulse for it. If this meeting is to be of benefit, I am convinced it has to deal with the final negotiating package which contains the still pending essentials of a global CW ban. The meeting should agree on both the mandate and guidelines of negotiation and be in a position to set a date for the conclusion of the negotiations. It could also confirm what has already been agreed and could come to an understanding concerning the date of the final round at Foreign-Minister level.

I know about the concerns, I also know about the prejudice and the existing scepticism. But we have to do it, if we do not want to dash the people's hope of peace and a secure future.

It is owing to the initiative of many in this room and thanks to the readiness for compromise of all that we tried this year to design the architecture of a future comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. All groups have submitted their ideas thereon. They should constitute building components for the co-operative preparation of such an important treaty. Admittedly, the distance to be travelled along this road is still long, and this is underscored by critical debates we had on this subject. Questions are posed whether the one or other issue raised is a gambit by one or other group. Some fear that the two super-Powers would disregard the others, and so on. Here lie reasons why the Conference's work in the field of a nuclear test ban has so far been limited in scope. To surmount these obstacles is, I think, the very aim of our decision jointly taken in July this year on the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

This calls for confidence and this calls for the ability to recognize and make use of new developments which are going on. I trust that this will be the case. Furthermore, I trust that thereby we will be able to terminate the arms race on Earth and to prevent it in outer space.

It was Emmanuel Kant who, 200 years ago, described the "condition politique" in the following way: "The necessity to decide reaches farther than the possibility to recognize". That this holds true, more than it did ever before, is indisputable. As a realist, I also know that we cannot build today's security on visions for tomorrow. On the other hand, as actors in this Conference, we also know full well that we must create the foundation for future security today. And for it to come true, we need visions.

My vision is that the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe will be agreed upon at the CSCE summit in Paris, that it will be followed by a second treaty on confidence- and security-building measures, that the START negotiations between the United States and the USSR will be wound up successfully and concluded at the end of this year, that 1991 will become the year when a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is concluded, that positive results in the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear explosions will sooner or later lead us to the negotiating phase on a

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

nuclear-test-ban treaty, that defensive military structures and security concepts can become a central item of this Conference - if it is right that we do not want military confrontation, but strive for the prevention of war.

Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Konatina, Ambassador Berasategui, the members of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, interpreters and all the members of the secretariat, all that remains is for me to thank you all most sincerely for your excellent co-operation, for the friendly relations and good personal contacts. My wife, who is attending the plenary today in the upper gallery, and myself would like to express our deepest gratitude and appreciation for all your kindness in making our stay in Geneva most fruitful and memorable. We will treasure forever the pleasant memories of our association with you. We wish you all every success in your work, good health and happiness. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dietze warmly for his statement, which we followed with all due attention, as well as for his kind words to the Chair and the members of the Conference, Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui and all the members of the secretariat - including, of course, the interpreters. Thank you again, Sir.

Permit me now to inform you of the status of work on the Conference's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. As you know, the informal open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs concerning agenda items 3, 7 and 8 have resulted in agreement. I should like to extend special thanks to everyone who was involved in those consultations and contributed to their success. I hope that today, at the meeting it is to hold at 3 p.m., the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will adopt its report to the plenary. The other Ad hoc Committees have already completed their work. I hope that the reports of the Ad hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and a Nuclear Test Ban will be submitted to the Conference during next Tuesday's plenary meeting. The adoption of those reports will take place at our final plenary meeting, on Friday, 24 August.

Since the Conference's substantive work is almost complete, we shall not need a schedule of meetings for next week. I will simply remind you that we shall have two plenary meetings, on Tuesday and Friday, and that before the meeting on Friday, 24 August, there will be an informal meeting, at 4.30 p.m., for the second reading of the technical sections of the report and the substantive paragraphs. The secretariat hopes to be able to distribute all the documents concerning the draft annual report at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 23 August, in all the working languages. The text in English might even be distributed a little earlier, at noon on Wednesday.

There is no other business for today and I therefore intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 21 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.